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1.  Introduction 
Populations are ageing, especially in Europe and Japan. For each pensioner there were 
approximately six workers in 2000, whereas in 2050 there will only be three. This may 
pose a major socio-economic problem. The main reason is that most countries have a 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system,  i.e. the working generations pay the old-age 
pensions of retired generations. When the ratio of workers to pensioners falls, the 
contributions of the working generations have to rise, sometimes dramatically. Not only 
will  expenditure on old-age pensions rise but also expenditure on health care. The 
higher tax burden on working generations will exacerbate pre-existing tax distortions 
and reduce economic efficiency. In fact, a vicious circle of higher taxes, falling labour 
supply and even higher taxes may arise, making the PAYG-systems unsustainable. 
Governments explore different ways to a lleviate the burden on future working 
generations. One way is to move towards a funded pension system, in which  the 
contributions of workers are invested to finance their own old-age income. An 
alternative way is to increase taxes now and create surpluses on the government budget 
for some time, leading to falling government debt. Both ways are essentially similar: 
they put the burden on the current working generation, rather than the future working 
generations and boost national savings. 
When developed countries simultaneously try to raise savings, where should they 
invest? Excess savings could drive down interest rates, thereby weakening the 
effectiveness of such a policy. Which countries will be able to absorb the excess savings 
of the ageing developed countries? There are also important differences in the pace and 
degree of ageing within the group of developed countries. In the US, fertility is higher 
than in Europe and Japan, which is one of the reasons why its old-age dependency ratio 
rises less. Besides, developing countries have younger populations than developed 
countries. Especially fast-growing countries in Asia may offer investment opportunities 
that promise a good rate of return. Developed countries can thus invest their excess 
savings in developing countries, which helps the developed countries to mitigate the 
economic consequences of ageing and developing countries to grow faster. Ageing may 
thus have strong effects on international capital flows. Capital may thus be reallocated 
within the group of developed countries and start to flow towards developing countries. 
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Nevertheless, this account of capital flows and ageing assumes a lot. It overlooks that 
ageing is common to all countries. Moreover, it assumes perfect capital mobility, while 
empirical  evidence suggests otherwise. This paper takes a closer look at the different 
elements in the story about ageing and capital flows. What are the effects of ageing on 
capital flows? How mobile is capital? And to what extent could international capital 
flows help to mitigate the economic effects of ageing? 
We review the existing evidence on the role of international capital markets in an ageing 
world in a non-technical way and with an eye towards policymakers. The set-up of this 
paper is as follows: In section 2 we sketch the important demographic changes ahead of 
us. We pay attention to differences across countries in these demographic transitions, as 
well as to the factors behind the process of demographic changes. Section 3 discusses 
how the different factors underlying the ageing process influence the balance between 
national savings and investment. It takes a closer look at the different elements of the 
current account: savings, investment and the government budget. It also addresses 
possible policy responses to ageing and their effect on international capital flows. 
Section 4 then considers the empirical evidence about capital mobility and the 
possibility that capital will flow from North to South (and back). Section 5 then studies 
the effects of a lower (or higher) interest rate on the effectiveness of savings-enhancing 
policies, using the example of the funded pension system of the Netherlands. Section 6 
draws conclusions. 
2.  Ageing across the world: Similarities and differences 
The ageing of populations, mainly driven by lower fertility and higher life 
expectancy, is a world-wide phenomenon. There are, however, important 
differences in the pace and degree of ageing, between Europe and the 
United States for example but mainly between developing and developed 
countries. 
Ageing is a phenomenon that is common to many countries and regions. The United 
Nations’ World population prospects: The 2000 revision provides detailed information 
about demographic changes for the 1950-2000 period and projections for the period of 
2001-50. Figure 1 shows the so-called old-age dependency ratios for various countries 
and world regions, i.e. the population of 65 and older as a percentage of the total 
population, based on the UN’s medium variant.
1 Immediately clear is that without 
exception this ratio is projected to increase. This holds for Japan with the highest old-
age dependency ratio in 2000 as well as for Africa with the lowest. In fact, fast increases 
are not confined to the group of rich countries, but also occur in China and Latin 
America, that are projected to have a more similar ratio as the US in 2050. 
In spite of the common trend, the pace and the degree of the population ageing process 
differ substantially across countries and world regions. In Africa, Europe and Japan the 
old-age dependency ratios are expected to double over the next 50 years. The degree of 
ageing, however, is rather different. In Africa the old-age dependency ratio in 2050 is 
with 7% very low in international perspective. It is in sharp contrast with Japan and 
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Europe: by 2050 about 36% of the Japanese population will be 65 or older, while in 
Europe 29% of the people will be 65+. In the US, however, the old-age dependency 
ratio flattens out and in 2050 approximately one-fifth of the population  will be 65 or 
older.  From  an  international perspective, this can be considered as an intermediate 
ageing-effect.
2 
 
Figure 1. Projections for the old-age dependency ratio, 2000-50 
 
Source: United Nations (2001). 
 
 
The differences across countries a nd world regions are even clearer in Figure 2, 
showing the future developments in the working-age ( i.e. 20-64) population as a 
percentage of the total population. In Africa, the share of the working-age population 
shows a steady increase over the next 50 years. In Europe, Japan and the US the relative 
size of the working-age population starts to shrink around 2010-20, and in 2050 will be 
6 to 9 percentage points lower than at present. Also, in Latin America the share of the 
working-age population is expected to decrease, but the turning point is later and the 
effect of ageing is less pronounced. 
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Figure 2. Projected development in the working-age populations (% of total) 
 
Source: United Nations (2001). 
To sum up, while the projected demographic changes over the next 50 years differ in 
their timing and magnitude throughout the world, the differences are most pronounced 
between the developed countries on the one hand and the developing and emerging 
regions (Africa, Asia, and Latin America) on the other.
3 But differences also emerge 
within the group of rich countries. Japan and Europe are affected more by the process of 
ageing than the US. 
2.1  Factors behind population ageing 
Various forces drive the process of ageing:  
•  declining fertility;  
•  increasing life-expectancy; and  
•  the baby boom after the Second World War.  
It is important to distinguish the forces behind ageing as they may affect savings and 
investments in different ways. First, fertility typically shows a sharp decline when poor 
countries improve their living standards. The Asian experience is illuminating in this 
respect. Higgins and Williamson (1996) present data on youth-dependency rates in Asia 
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approximations for future changes in fertility, life expectancy and migration. These three components are 
likely to be influenced by the process of economic growth, improvements in health care and the 
development of new drugs, policies (such as China’s one-child policy and immigration policies in rich 
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(the population up to the age of 14 as a percentage of the total population). Spectacular 
drops in youth dependency have been observed in the old and new tigers in East and 
South-East Asia: in Hong Kong it fell from a peak of 40.7% in 1960-64 to 20.1% in 
1990-92, and in Singapore from 43.5% to 23.3%. Similarly, China saw a decline from a 
peak of 40.0% in 1965-69 to 26.4% in 1990-92. Fertility is strongly related to female 
educational attainment. Higher educational achievements of women go hand in hand 
with lower fertility rates, decreasing youth-dependency ratios and the worsening of the 
ageing problem.
4 
Second, a contributing factor to ageing is an increase in longevity. Life expectancy 
typically increases rapidly in developing countries that succeed  in  improving living 
standards, working conditions, environmental quality, health care and so forth. But in 
developed countries an increase in life expectancy is also observed. For instance, life 
expectancy at birth in the US has risen from 69.7 years in 1960 to 76.5 in 1997 (cf. 
Lichtenberg, 2002). According to Lichtenberg (2002), this development is supported by 
medical innovations in the form of new drug approvals and expenditures on medical 
care. Although future changes in longevity are difficult to predict, further increases in 
life expectancy seem likely. Consequently, the scope for a lengthening of the working-
life by postponing retirement increases. 
While longevity is increasing in the Western world and in a number of developing 
countries, some poor countries see themselves confronted with falling life expectancy at 
birth, mainly because of the devastating effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Poor access 
to drugs will only worsen this development. 
A third factor behind population ageing is a temporary hike in the birth rate, the so-
called ‘baby boom’. As the baby boomers retire, the fraction of elderly in the population 
will increase. This increase in the old-age dependency ratio is temporary and the 
demographic transition comes to a halt when the last of the baby boom generation has 
passed away. 
3.  Population ageing and current accounts 
How ageing affects international capital flows can be studied, starting from the famous 
macroeconomic identity for the current account (CA), equal to the net savings of the 
private and the public sector: 
(1)  G T I S CA - + - =  
where  S denotes private savings,  I private investments, and T -G is the difference 
between public revenues (taxes) and public spending. The current account is positive 
when the sum of net private savings and public savings exceeds domestic investment, so 
that the country is a net exporter of capital to other countries. Population ageing can 
affect the current account through the three channels S, I and T - G. Each of these 
channels will be discussed separately in the following three sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. 
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Section 3.3 will also discuss the policy responses from national governments to ageing, 
since these will affect savings and investments. Section 3.4 concludes with empirical 
work and model simulations about the impact of ageing on international capital flows. 
3.1  Private investments 
The declining fertility underlying the ageing process will lead to smaller 
growth of the potential labour force and lower employment. This will 
undoubtedly have a negative impact on demand for capita, but to what 
extent is, however, uncertain. It also depends on the policy reaction to the 
increasing longevity, which may mitigate the decrease in labour force. The 
implication for productivity per worker is uncertain as well as ambiguous. 
As long as ageing is driven by the decline in fertility it will imply a decline in (the 
growth rate of) employment. Given the stock of capital, this decline amounts to an 
increase in the capital-labour ratio. Capital deepening will reduce the marginal 
productivity of capital and, in turn, the incentive to accumulate capital. In other words, 
investment demand will fall. 
That ageing reduces investment is recognised in the economic literature, but to what 
extent is, however, less clear. It depends on at least two factors, about which there is 
less consensus. First, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is 
important for the effect of lower employment on the return on investment. A smaller 
elasticity implies a larger effect (in absolute terms) on the investment return and thus on 
investment demand. Second, the existence of adjustment costs may dampen the fall in 
investment. 
Ageing not only affects the number of workers but may also have a direct effect on 
productivity of these workers (apart from capital deepening). On the one hand, ageing 
may positively affect average productivity since older workers are more experienced 
and productive (the  experience effect). On the other hand, ageing could retard 
productivity growth when switching to a new technology becomes increasingly costly 
or – more generally – when change is increasingly held suspect with age (the resistance 
effect). These direct effects have received little attention in economics literature. Nahuis 
et al. (2000) take a first step towards analysing the relationship between demographic 
composition and productivity (growth). The available empirical evidence suggests that 
the share of people aged 65 and over hampers productivity growth, while the fraction of 
people in the 50-64 group contributes favourably to productivity growth. Clearly, more 
theoretical and empirical research is needed to establish robust relationships between 
ageing and productivity. 
3.2  Private savings 
The basic idea of the life-cycle hypothesis is that people save when working 
and dissave when retired. The results from microeconomic research do not 
fundamentally challenge this idea but raise doubts about the extent to which 
retired generations dissave. Moreover, to what extent and in which direction 
a higher life expectation and lower fertility affect consumption-savings 
decisions of households is unclear. Macroeconomic estimations give, 
however, a clear picture: they suggest a clearly negative effect of ageing on 
national savings rates. POPULATION AGEING AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
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3.2.1  The life-circle hypothesis 
The life-cycle hypothesis as put forward by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) is a 
common starting point for studies into households’ savings behaviour.
5 According to 
the hypothesis, people tend to smooth their consumption pattern by dissaving when 
young, saving during working life, and again dissaving when old.
6 
Empirically, the life-cycle hypothesis has had “more successes than failures” (Browning 
and Crossley, 2001, pp. 20). Nevertheless, the exact shape of the age-savings profile is 
subject to an ongoing debate. For example, Poterba (2001) presents data on age-specific 
asset holdings, see Figure  3.
7 The figure clearly shows that asset holdings rapidly 
increase in the period of life between 40 and 64. But the figure also shows that the age-
wealth profile declines rather gradually when households are in their retirement years. 
 
Figure 3. Asset holdings (×$1000) and age 
 
Source: Poterba (2001). 
                                                                 
5 For more elaborate discussions of the life-cycle model, the reader is referred to Modigliani (1986), 
Browning and Crossley (2001), and Kapteyn and Panis (2002). See also Chapter 15 in Mankiw (1992) for 
a textbook discussion. 
6 More precisely, agents want to smooth the marginal utility of consumption over their lifetime (see 
Browning and Crossley (2001) for a clear discussion and examples). 
7 The data are derived from cross-sectional estimates using the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (US 
households). Cohort and time effects may hamper the interpretation. Nevertheless, Poterba (2001) shows 
that the quantitative importance of these cohort and time effects is limited. CANTON, EWIJK & TANG 
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That retired generations do not dissave much and leave bequests, has several 
explanations. First, generations are connected and parents are altruistic towards their 
children.  Thus dissaving by the elderly is limited  because part of their wealth is 
transferred to the next generation through bequests.
8 Second, people have uncertain life 
spans and they cannot write perfect life insurance contracts, so that bequests are 
sometimes unintended (cf. Davies, 1981). Third, bequests may arise from a strategic 
motive. In particular, testators may use bequests to influence the decisions of potential 
beneficiaries, cf. Bernheim et al. (1985). For example, bequests can be used as 
compensation for services rendered by beneficiaries, such as care and attention.
9 
Notwithstanding the discussion about the exact relation between age and savings, the 
broad pattern of dissaving when young, saving when working and again dissaving when 
old is fairly robust. It also appears from estimations across countries and over time, that 
relate countries’ savings rates to the age structure of their population. A robust finding 
is that a higher share of the population between the age of 40 and 65 leads to a higher 
savings rate, whereas a higher share of the population older than 65 leads to a lower 
macroeconomic propensity to save. Figure 4  shows the estimated effect of age on 
savings rates. Estimation results are presented in the Appendix. Clearly, the estimated 
age-savings profile agrees with the l ife-cycle hypothesis. For example, the group 
between 40-45 saves above average, whereas the group between 65 and 70 saves below 
average. 
                                                                 
8 Canton and Meijdam (1997) study the impact of population ageing on macroeconomic outcomes in 
often-used models, varying with respect to the degree of altruism. With altruism parents take the utility of 
their children into account in the design of their savings plan. Without altruism, parents – and their 
‘unloved children’ – make separate savings plans. 
9 The model by Bernheim  et al.  (1985)  and the notion of strategic bequests can have important 
macroeconomic implications. Although parents are altruistic towards their children,  the  Ricardian 
equivalence (see text box) no longer holds. Also, the model suggests interesting interactions between 
demography and savings. As a credible threat of disinheritance requires that there are at least two 
beneficiaries, the increasing number of single-child families could reduce the incentive to save to buy 
attention. Likewise, Japan’s high savings rate can be explained (at least to some extent) by the fact that 
the vast majority of elderly Japanese live with their children. Finally, the strategic bequest mechanism is 
inoperative in some European countries, such as Sweden, as testators are required to divide the bulk of 
their estates evenly between their children. POPULATION AGEING AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
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Figure 4. Estimated relation between gross domestic savings (% GDP) and age 
structure of population 
 
Sources: de Groot and Tang (2003); see also the Appendix. 
 
3.2.2  The effect of ageing on savings 
With the life-cycle hypothesis in mind, we can explore the effects of ageing on 
macroeconomic (private) savings rates. A distinction between a composition effect and 
behavioural effects (cf. Bloom et al., 2002) is helpful. 
The composition effect follows from the assumptions that the average savings ratios for 
different age groups are constant but that the shares of the different groups in the entire 
population change. Under this assumption, population ageing reduces the average 
savings rate. As the fraction of elderly in the population grows, the groups with low or 
negative savings become relatively larger, leading to a lower overall savings rate. 
Behavioural effects – derived from the life-cycle framework – presume that the savings 
ratios of different groups and individuals change. These effects are more complicated, 
and depend on the underlying causes of the ageing process, i.e. the increase in longevity 
and the fall in fertility. 
Bloom et al. (2002) study the effects of an increase in longevity on optimal savings 
plans. For a given retirement age, an increase in longevity will tend to spur savings 
during working life, to compensate for the longer period of dissaving when retired. 
When retirement is endogenous and people spend a larger fraction of their lives in good 
health as longevity increases, the effect on savings is ambiguous as people may find it 
optimal to extend their working life and postpone retirement. Indeed, the phenomenon 
of a ‘second career’ is becoming more and more common, especially among knowledge 
workers (cf. The Economist, 2001). According to Bloom et al., the dominant effect is 
that increases in longevity lead to higher savings rates at every age. They apply this idea CANTON, EWIJK & TANG 
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to explain the boom in savings in East Asia during 1950-90 as a result of rising life 
expectancy and falling youth dependency, and the decline in savings rates in response to 
falling life expectancies in Africa. 
The relationship between longevity and savings is, however, more complex than Bloom 
et al. may suggest. It depends h ighly on the institutional setting. For example, their 
study seems more relevant for a country with a funded pension system than a country 
with a PAYG-system (cf. Kapteyn and Panis, 2002). 
With declining fertility, different mechanisms may be working in different directions. 
On the one hand, for smaller families less private saving is needed to keep the amount 
of resources available per child (e.g. to pay for tuition) unchanged. On the other hand, 
Brooks (2000) considers, however, the equally plausible possibility that the weight per 
child in the parental utility function is declining in the number of children. In that case, 
a decrease in the number of children leads to an increase in consumption per child. 
Which consideration dominates the saving-consumption decision is hard to tell a priori. 
Interestingly, Higgins and Williamson (1996) provide empirical evidence for a close 
relationship between the impressive decline in the Asian youth dependency ratio and the 
substantial increase in savings rates since the 1960s. This suggests that there is a trade-
off between investment in human capital (i.e. children) and accumulation of physical 
capital. In any case, our understanding of the relationship between private savings, 
fertility and education is limited and needs to be improved. 
The direct effects of lower fertility and higher life expectancy are  probably  less 
important than the indirect effects through forced changes in the institutional setting and 
government policies. Ageing puts government budgets under pressure and forces 
governments to engineer important changes in pension systems, social security, 
budgetary policy and so on. The next subsection (3.3) continues with a discussion of 
government budgets and policies. 
Before we turn to the public sector and public policies, let us at least conclude that 
estimations across countries and over time come up with the robust finding that ageing 
has or will have a strong, negative impact on savings at the aggregate level. This could 
simply be the effect of changes in the composition of the population. Figure 5 shows 
both historical and projected savings rates for China, India, Italy and the US, where the 
projections are based o n the same estimation results that also underlie Figure  4. 
Whereas in China and India the changing age structure of their populations lead to a 
peak in the savings rates between 2010 and 2020, in Italy and the US savings rates are 
projected to fall from 2000 onwards. For all countries, the decline in the savings rate is 
most pronounced between 2030 and 2040. Of course, these projections do not take into 
account changes in policies and institutions that may boost savings rates, especially in 
developed countries. POPULATION AGEING AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
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Figure 5. Historical national savings rates, 1960-2000, and projected rates, 2010-50 
 
Sources: de Groot and Tang; see also the Appendix. 
 
3.3  Government budget and policies 
The government budget is the third channel though which ageing influences 
the b alance between national savings and investment, and thereby the 
current account. Ageing puts the public sector under pressure. Expenditures 
on old-age pensions, as part of PAYG system, and health care are expected 
to rise. This threatens to raise the tax b urden on working generations 
significantly. When governments want to prevent this, they have two broad 
options. On the one hand governments may try to stimulate the participation 
of working-age generations in the labour market. On the other hand they 
can lower the level of old-age pensions in the future or raise contributions 
and taxes now or both. The first option tends to boost investment demand 
whereas the second option tends to raise the propensity to save. 
3.3.1  Pressure on the government budget 
Ageing is first and foremost a problem of distribution, namely between young and old 
generations. It has arisen with the introduction of PAYG systems. The PAYG systems 
were introduced in many countries to give old generations a decent income. It was part 
of a broader programme to provide assistance to those who saw their income decline 
and to provide insurance against labour market risks such as disability and 
unemployment. Public pension systems can also be seen as a form of insurance, namely 
against longevity. In particular, the period during which elderly people are retired (and 
are presumably unable to work) is uncertain. Pensions ensure the income stream of 
people who run the risk of becoming old without adequate income.  CANTON, EWIJK & TANG 
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A PAYG-system is a social contract between young and old generations: the young 
generations support the old generations in the expectation that once they retire 
themselves, they will also receive income support. If the age structure of the population 
were stable, neither party would have an incentive to break the social contract. The root 
of the problem is, however, that the age structure of the population does change during 
the coming decades. The baby boom, fewer children, and longevity will raise the 
dependency ratios and put the social contract between generations under pressure: the 
tax burden on young working generations will rise, sometimes dramatically. To 
illustrate, Figure 6 shows the expected increase in the expenditures on old-age pensions 
in a number of countries. It reveals that the increase is significant for the majority of 
countries and falls in the range of 3 to 5% of GDP. There are substantial differences 
between countries, however. In the Netherlands, Denmark and Finland, expenditures 
increase substantially. In Japan and Poland, they are actually projected to decline as 
share of GDP, in part because old-age pensions are not indexed to wages.
10 
 
Figure 6. Public expenditure on old-age pensions in 2000 and 2035 for various OECD 
countries 
 
Source: OECD (2001). 
This problem of an increasing tax burden on young generations is reinforced by another 
effect of ageing, namely increasing public expenditures on health care. Historical data, 
presented in Figure 7, show that health care expenditures have increased significantly 
during the past decades. The pattern is, however, again diverse. Between 1960 and 
                                                                 
10 The differences originate partly in different assumptions behind the projections. For instance, Spain 
assumes that its unemployment rate falls from 14% in 2000 to 4% in 2035. Italy assumes an increase in 
the participation rate of women from 55% in 2000 to 77% in  2050. Whether such assumptions are 
plausible is somewhat doubtful. It typically calls for reforms to reduce unemployment or increase 
participation. It is not clear whether countries are willing (or able) to do that. POPULATION AGEING AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
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1995, health care expenditures in the US increased from 5% to 14% of GDP, in the 
Netherlands from 4% to 8% and in the UK from 4% to 6%. Demographic changes in 
this period just explain a part of the historical increase in health care expenditures. 
Baumol’s law is at work as well. This law says that a sector with relatively slow 
productivity growth must raise its relative price and will see its share in income and 
production rise (when price elasticity’s are low and/or income elasticity’s are high). 
The upward trend in health care expenditure is not likely to reverse, if only because the 
populations are ageing. The OECD (2001) has collected projections for a number of 
countries. Between 2000 and 2035 the increase in expenditures as a result of ageing 
only is predicted to lie between roughly 1% of GDP for the Czech Republic, Denmark 
and Finland, to more than 4% of GDP in Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands. 
Figure 7. Health care expenditure in five OECD countries (% GDP), 1960-97 
 
Source: OECD (2001). 
 
The fast increasing public expenditures on old-age benefits and health care put pressure 
on the government budget. More generally, they put pressure on society. First, it puts a 
strain on the intergenerational contract between young and old generations because of 
the increasing tax burden on the young. Second, the higher tax burden on the young 
exacerbates distortions in the economy. Indeed, taxes induce behavioural responses 
because private agents will try to avoid them, e.g. by working fewer hours, invest less 
and consume untaxed products. These responses erode the tax base, thereby reducing 
tax revenue, as well as reduce economic welfare. 
3.3.2  Policy reforms: Higher savings and more investment 
With growing pressure on the public budget and on society, governments must react, 
sooner or later. Most countries are considering measures to arrive at a ‘fair’ distribution 
of the burden of ageing that is acceptable for young and old, and to avoid a too high tax CANTON, EWIJK & TANG 
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burden. We discuss two broad options to prevent an increase in the tax burden on 
younger generations. 
Investment in human capital: Higher participation  
The problems arising from ageing are partly the result of increasing longevity in an 
institutional setting with a given retirement age. When people grow older and the 
retirement age does not change a falling share of workers needs to carry the financial 
burden of a rising share of retired people. The most straightforward response to this 
would be an increase in the retirement age. (see also Bovenberg, 2001). Sweden, 
Norway and the US have already made steps in this direction. Thus, the financial 
burden of longevity is shared between younger and older generations. Since the number 
of healthy years has increased and is usually expected to increase further, sharing the 
risk is not impossible or unreasonable. It may be imposed gradually, e.g. by linking the 
official retirement age to life expectancy. 
An alternative investment in human capital is increasing the participation rate of those 
younger than the age of 65. In Europe, there seem to be ample opportunities for this. 
First, some European countries such as Belgium, Poland, Italy and Spain feature high 
unemployment rates. Secondly, the participation of older workers is low in most 
countries. For instance, in Austria, Belgium and Hungary less than one-third of the male 
population between the ages of 55-64 is working. Finally, the female participation rate 
is below the male participation rate in  all European countries. On average, this 
difference amounts to 15 percentage points. Female participation is high in 
Scandinavian countries, but particularly low  when compared with males in Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain. 
An alternative way to broaden the tax base is to let more immigrants enter. This 
assumes that immigrants will make a net contribution to public finances. A number of 
studies suggest, however, that the fiscal impact of immigration is not necessarily 
positive (e.g. Roodenburg et al., 2003). When the net contribution is positive but small, 
very high numbers of immigration are necessary for immigration to make a difference. 
This would make it unlikely that such a policy finds broad political support. 
Investing in financial capital: Switching systems 
The problem of ageing is partly temporary: it is associated with large income 
redistribution from the future young generations to the baby-boom generations. To relax 
this problem, the baby  boomers could share the temporary burden with future 
generations and partly pay for their own old-age pensions.
11 The government can 
encourage financial savings by the baby-boom generation in several ways: 
                                                                 
11 Referring to intergenerational fairness, Hans Werner Sinn ( 2000) points out that the baby-boom 
generations have failed to invest in ‘human capital’. They have chosen to spend less time and effort in 
raising children. Families have become smaller, and people have opted for lives without children. In 
Europe, fertility rates have fallen in the second half of the 20th century, and are often below 2.1, the value 
that is needed for mere reproduction. This has put the PAYG-system under pressure. Sinn finds it fair that 
these generations invest in real capital to save for their old-age pension. This argument also implies that 
current tax rates for households without children should rise more than tax rates for households with 
children. POPULATION AGEING AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
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•  First, it can reduce the net income support to retired generations. The direct effect 
is reduction of the tax burden on the future, working generations.
12 To the extent 
that households anticipate a decline in the real value of old-age pensions, they 
will save more to make up for this decline. 
•  Second, the government can create a budget surplus so as to reduce public debt, 
by raising current taxes (or cut current public spending).
13 As long as Ricardian 
equivalence between debt and taxes does not hold, this will reduce private 
consumption and raise private savings. The text box gives a brief explanation of 
Ricardian equivalence and highlights the conditions under which the equivalence 
breaks down. 
•  Third and finally, the government can – partially – switch from a PAYG system 
towards a funded system. In the latter system individuals invest in funds now 
from which they draw to finance their old-age income later. 
Apart from the distributional motive for sharing the burden of ageing, it is sometimes 
also defended on efficiency grounds. As far as these policies help to avoid increases in 
future tax rates, they contribute to overall welfare by limiting the distortionary impact of 
taxation. Taxes change behaviour of economic agents and impose costs on society. 
These costs vary more than proportionally with the rate of taxation. Therefore, it is 
efficient to smooth the rate of taxation over time; with a constant rate, the costs of 
taxation are minimised. Smoothing the burden across generations often concurs with 
smoothing tax rates over time.
14 
Other popular arguments for shifting towards a more funded system are more 
problematic. One argument is that the returns on contributions in a funded system are 
generally higher than the returns in a PAYG system. The rate of return in a funded 
system is equal to the real interest rate (on government bonds) and perhaps the excess 
return on investment to the extent that pension funds invest in equity. In a PAYG-
system the ‘rate of return’ depends on the real growth rate of labour income, on which it 
is based. In the long run the growth of labour income equals the sum of employment 
and productivity growth. Historically, the real interest rate exceeds the growth rate of 
labour income, which suggests that switching from a PAYG scheme to a funded system 
will yield a higher rate of return. Another argument is that contributions in a funded 
system are l ess distortionary than in a PAYG system as households pay for their own 
                                                                 
12 Engineering a relative decline in (real) old-age benefits does not always involve a drastic action or 
decision. Just relaxing the indexation of future old-age pensions to wages can yield significant savings in 
present value terms. 
13 For example, the budgetary consequences of ageing in the Netherlands are studied in Van Ewijk et al. 
(2000). Public finance will show a budget surplus over a long period of time if policies remain 
unchanged. The public debt is therefore reduced substantially. The surplus will turn into a deficit by 2016. 
In particular, the ageing leads to a sharp increase of expenditures on public pensions and health care. A 
mechanism of increasing debts, interest payments and deficits will turn current policies unsustainable in 
the long run. As a way to arrive at a sustainable path of public finances, Van Ewijk et al. (2000) show that 
a relatively mild increase of direct taxes is required. 
14 The idea of tax smoothing is bread and butter for economists, ever since Barro introduced it in 1974. 
For example, Van Ewijk et al. (2001) assume that a constant burden is optimal and tries to calculate how 
much the Dutch government must raise current taxes to achieve that. CANTON, EWIJK & TANG 
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pensions. Both arguments concern the steady state only. Unfortunately it is not costless 
to arrive in this steady state. As pointed out by Sinn (2000) is not possible to improve 
the welfare of some and to maintain the welfare of others (the Pareto criterion). Some of 
the current generations will lose, since they have to pay twice, for the PAYG system 
and now also for the funded system. This makes a regime switch difficult to 
accomplish. 
Political economy of ageing  
Indeed, the political economy of ageing is important for the course of actions that 
governments are likely to take. An extensive review of this takes us too far. To 
underline the relevance of political economy, we discuss two  examples from the 
economic literature.  
First, the elderly m ay use the voting mechanism to steer policy to less growth-
promoting activities. Some direct support for the latter interpretation is provided by 
Poterba (1996), who deals with the relationship between educational spending and 
demographic composition. He finds evidence of generational competition in the 
allocation of public funds. Educational spending per child in 48 US states in the post-
war period is negatively related to the fraction of elderly. The empirical results indicate 
that the projected rise in the fraction of the population aged 65+ from 12.5% in 1990 to 
18.7% in 2030 translates into a 10% reduction in educational spending per child. And, 
as Poterba (1996) puts it: “The implications of such changes for income inequality and 
economic growth depend on controversial parameters linking school spending to school 
outcomes and wages, but the potential effects could be substantial” (pp. 24-25). 
Second, Bütler (2001) studies the political feasibility of pension reforms. In particular, 
while a uniform reduction in pension levels would be resisted by retirees, a financially 
equivalent increase in retirement age should find support among retirees  – at least 
among those beyond the targeted statutory retirement age. Using data on a Swiss 
referendum on an increase in female retirement age from 62 to 64 held in 1998, Bütler 
finds empirical support for this prediction. 
Conclusion 
The increasing public expenditure on old-age pensions and health care will in  most 
countries put the government budget and, more generally, society under pressure. 
Governments must sooner or later respond to this pressure. They have two broad 
options that are possible to combine in different ways. First, they can try to raise the 
participation on labour markets. If effective, this option leads to more employment as 
well as more investment. Second, they can try to raise private and public savings. The 
effect of net demand for capital is unclear. POPULATION AGEING AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
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Ricardian equivalence 
Until now we have treated the private and public sector as independent entities. Nevertheless, 
when Ricardian equivalence holds, the public sector deficit or surplus will have repercussions 
on optimal savings plans by households. For instance, a public sector deficit financed by 
issuing government bonds implies an increase of future taxes to service the debt (ceteris 
paribus). Forward-looking households anticipate this future tax increase and adjust their 
consumption plans downward to smooth their life-cycle consumption possibilities. Likewise, 
in case of a public sector surplus, households expect a future tax reduction and anticipate this 
development by adjusting their consumption plans upward by saving less. 
The Ricardian equivalence debate is summarised in Romer (1996). He mentions the following 
reasons why the Ricardian equivalence may not hold exactly: 
1. Population growth; 
2. Liquidity constraints; 
3. Non-lump-sum taxes; and 
4. Rule-of-thumb consumption behaviour. 
First, when new individuals are entering the economy, part of the future tax burden connected 
with the issue of bonds is borne by individuals who are not alive when the bond is issued. 
Therefore, the bond represents net wealth to those who are living at the time of the bond issue. 
A difficulty with this argument is that individuals with finite lifetimes may behave as if they 
are a single household (cf. Barro, 1974). When generations are connected by bequests, 
Ricardian equivalence may be restored, and individuals keep their consumption paths 
unchanged in response to a bond issue. Second, a bond issue may matter when households face 
liquidity constraints. In particular, when the household faces a higher interest rate for 
borrowing than the government does, the household may respond to a bond issue by increasing 
consumption if the government is borrowing on the household's behalf. Third, when taxes are 
not lump-sum but a function of income, a bond issue reduces the household's uncertainty about 
lifetime income. The future tax liability is large (low) if future income is large (low). This may 
induce households to increase current consumption. Fourth, and finally, individuals may not 
optimise over long horizons, but instead may follow  ‘rules-of-thumb’ in choosing their 
consumption-saving plans. As a result, people may increase their current consumption in 
response to a bond-financed tax cut. By and large, Romer concludes that "...Despite its logical 
appeal, there does not appear to be a strong case for using Ricardian equivalence to gauge the 
likely effects of governments' financing decisions in practice” (1996, pp. 72). 
 
 
3.4  Current accounts and capital flows 
Projections based on empirical work and model simulations show that 
Japan, Western Europe and the United States will see their current accounts 
improve at least up to 2010. After 2010, savings rates will fall faster than 
investment rates in most rich countries, although the timing and degree is 
uncertain. A crucial but unknown variable is the capital mobility (between 
developed and developing countries). 
Ageing has a negative impact on savings and investment. The changing composition of 
populations will (eventually) reduce private savings and thus the supply of capital. 
Ageing also leads to less employment (growth) and less investment, reducing demand CANTON, EWIJK & TANG 
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for capital. Further, in response to the upward pressure on the public deficit and the 
growing strain on society, governments will respond: they will try to reverse the 
direction that these three variables threaten to take. The effect on net demand for capital 
is difficult to determine a priori. From this perspective, countries with similar patterns 
of ageing may differ in their net demand for capital. Of course, possibilities for trade in 
capital arise from differential effects of ageing but also from desynchronised patterns of 
ageing. In section 2 we have seen that countries differ in the pace and degree of ageing.  
With the uncertainty about the implications of ageing for current accounts and capital 
flows empirical studies and model simulations are more than welcome. They may help 
us to see regularities and gain insight in the future development of current accounts and 
capital flows. 
3.4.1  Econometric work 
A number of econometric studies on the relationship between ageing and international 
capital flows have emerged. The older studies often use somewhat rough indicators for 
population ageing, such as the old-age dependency ratios. More recent studies are 
almost exclusively based on a better method, proposed in Fair and Dominguez (1991). 
Fair and Dominguez construct a technique where account is taken of the entire age 
structure of the population. Without trying to be exhaustive, we shall review some of 
these more recent studies in this sub-section.  
The work of Higgins (1998) provides a good starting point. He relates savings and 
investment rates to the population age structures for a panel of 100 countries, covering 
the period from 1950 to 1989.
15 The estimation results suggest that the  ‘centre of 
gravity’ for investment demand is earlier in the age distribution than that for savings 
supply. In other words, the share of young workers in the population exerts a positive 
effect on the investment rate (and not on the savings rates), whereas the share of mature 
workers has a positive impact on the savings rate (and not on the investment rate). As a 
result, a country that sees its working-age population increase will first see its current 
account deteriorate and then improve. After the workers are retired, the current account 
will move towards a deficit. 
Lürhmann (2001) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) find similar results. Lührmann 
studies the relationship between demographic changes and international capital flows, 
using data for a broader set of countries (181) for later years (1970-97). Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2001) take a somewhat different approach. They study the evolution of 
net foreign asset positions for a group of 66 countries over the 1970-98 period. The 
estimated relation between demographic structure and net foreign assets is quite strong. 
The pattern of demographic effects is consistent with the results of Higgins and 
Lührmann. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti find a decline in the net foreign asset position if the 
population shares of younger age groups increase and a rise in net foreign assets if the 
share of workers near their retirement increases, with a maximum effect for the 50-54 
                                                                 
15 The separate demographic influences on saving and investment can only be identified when countries 
can borrow and lend on the international capital market without constraint and at a given world interest 
rate. With imperfect capital mobility, the econometric estimates reflect a mix of the separate effects on 
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age group. Finally, evidence is found for the running down of net foreign assets if the 
65+ age cohort increases.  
Higgins uses the estimation results to project the changes in the current account as a 
result of demographic developments alone into the future. Table  1 shows that in 
developed countries investment rates are projected to decline faster than savings rates, 
improving their current account. This effect is in 2025 not as strong as in 2010, when 
the baby-boom generation is expected to retire. 
Table  1. Projected changes in the current account as a result of demographic 
developments (% points of GDP) 
 
  2010  2025 
      Germany  1.1  1.3 
Japan  1.5  2.3 
United States  4.5  1.9 
OECD (unweighted average)  3.2  1.7 
           
Source: Higgins (1999). 
The projection in Table 1 raises questions, however. As Higgins himself notes, “Out-of-
sample projections cannot capture the general equilibrium effects of a novel pattern in 
demographic change”. The novel pattern is that the world population will get older, and 
not younger as in the estimation period. For this reason, model simulations that 
incorporate general-equilibrium effects and take into account the global, common trend 
of ageing, are useful and will therefore be discussed in the next sub-section. 
Furthermore, capital is not perfectly mobile, linking investment and savings. This 
makes it difficult to identify the separate effects of ageing on savings on the one hand 
and on investment on the other hand. More importantly, according to the projections the 
OECD will run a current account surplus in 2010 and 2025. This requires that the non-
OECD countries will have a corresponding deficit. But how mobile is capital and will 
the developing countries be able to absorb the inflow of investment funds? Given the 
fact that at the moment the net current account for the OECD as a whole is 
approximately zero, these questions are highly  relevant. Capital mobility (between 
developed and developing countries) is discussed in the next chapter. 
3.4.2  Model simulations 
Brooks (2000) and INGENUE (2001) simulate general-equilibrium models for the 
world economy to gauge the effects of ageing on i nternational capital flows. Both 
models employ the idea of the life-cycle: different generations make optimal savings-
consumption decisions, while they do not want to leave bequests. Labour supply is 
exogenous and follows directly from demographic projections. The investment-
production decision of firms is modelled in less detail than the savings-consumption 
decisions of households. Characteristic is that given labour supply there are decreasing CANTON, EWIJK & TANG 
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returns to capital: in every world region an increase in the capital-labour ratio leads to a 
fall in the rate of return to capital. In response to any difference in the rate of return 
investment funds will react: capital is perfectly mobile. 
The development of the current account for Japan and Western Europe is broadly the 
same in Brooks as it is in INGENUE. They improve their net foreign asset position 
further until they reach a turning point. After that Japan and Western Europe will see 
their current accounts deteriorate and will see it become negative eventually. B rooks 
predicts that Japan’s current account becomes negative around 2010. In INGENUE the 
turning point is later, around 2020. For Japan the current account recovers not earlier 
than after 2050 in Brooks, while INGENUE predicts movements around equilibrium 
after 2020. For Europe, both models predict a prolonged period of a current account 
deficit. 
Brooks projects the US to follow a similar pattern as Japan and Western Europe. First, 
its current account improves, until a peak in 2010, and then it deteriorates. A similar 
pattern is predicted in the scenario study by McMorrow and Roeger (2003). The 
simulation results of INGENUE, on the other hand, show that the current account of the 
region that includes the  US as well as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, see i ts 
current account improve throughout the simulation period: it swings from a deficit in 
2000 to a surplus in 2040. 
Of course, when the rich countries – Japan, Western Europe and the US – see their 
current account improve, the rest of the world must by definition import capital. This 
assumes that trade in capital between developed and developing countries is possible 
and does not meet important restrictions. This assumption is not obvious. Interesting are 
therefore simulation results of Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2001). They consider 
the possibility that capital mobility is restricted to the OECD-area. Under this restriction 
differences in the pattern of ageing among the rich countries become important. They 
show for example that Germany will export capital to the US after 2025. In the latter 
country the old-age dependency ratio does not rise as fast as in the rest of the OECD-
area, so that opportunities to invest are more abundant in the US than elsewhere. 
Computable general-equilibrium models are a helpful source of information in the 
discussion on the effects of population ageing on international capital flows and interest 
rate movements. One reason is that these models do not suffer from the problem of 
inconsistency to which out-of-sample projections on the basis of empirical work are 
prone. The model simulations and Higgins’ projections share, however, the result that 
the rich OECD countries will see their current account improve until at least 2010. After 
that year important differences occur, not o nly between models simulations and 
straightforward projections but also between the various computable general-
equilibrium models themselves. 
A critical factor in both empirical work and model simulations is the mobility of capital. 
If capital is not perfectly mobile, estimated effects of ageing on investment rates partly 
reflect the indirect effects on saving rates. This complicates projections for investment 
and saving rates, especially when capital mobility changes. Similarly, the model 
simulations assume perfect capital mobility within the group of rich countries as well as 
between rich and poor countries. With perfect mobility large swings in the current 
account are feasible, but with only imperfect capital mobility savings and investment POPULATION AGEING AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
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are tied together, at least to some extent. Therefore, we consider the evidence for capital 
mobility in the next chapter. 
4.  International capital mobility 
Capital mobility among developed countries and,  a  fortiori between 
developed and developing countries  are far from perfect: domestic 
investment rates closely follow domestic savings rates, the share of foreign 
assets in investment portfolios is small and interest rate differentials remain. 
Explanations for limited net trade in capital are found in restrictions on 
trade, barriers to trade in goods and asymmetric information between 
domestic and foreign investors. Limited capital mobility and other reasons 
cast doubt on the idea that net trade in net capital between North and South 
will occur at a large scale. 
A perhaps  common perception is that capital flows across the globe in search for 
profitable investment opportunities and responds to even the smallest difference in rates 
of return. Undoubtedly, capital flows have grown relative to income and production in 
the world. Figure 8 illustrates that OECD countries hold significant foreign positions, 
indeed. Against the persistent deficit position of the US, other countries (Japan and the 
Netherlands) have built up a lasting creditor position. For the OECD as a whole the net 
positions largely cancel (Lane and Milesi-Feretti, 2001), implying that capital flows are 
in particular relevant to the richer countries. 
 
Figure 8. Net Foreign Assets for various OECD countries 
 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2001). 
But this does not ensure that capital mobility is indeed perfect. In fact, international 
trade in capital is often subject to important restrictions and high costs. Besides, trade in 
capital and in goods are strongly related. Since trade in goods is subject to important CANTON, EWIJK & TANG 
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transport and transaction costs, trade in capital also diminishes rapidly with distance. 
This chapter will argue that capital mobility is far from perfect, within the group of 
developed and let alone between developed and developing countries. The implication 
is that savings and investment are still tied together. 
4.1  The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle 
The gap between (public and private) domestic saving and (public and private) domestic 
investment equals the current account surplus. In turn, this surplus corresponds to a net 
capital outflow. For most countries, the average gap between domestic savings and 
investments is small. This already points at modest international capital flows. In a 
seminal contribution, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) take a closer look at the correlation 
between savings and investments. They write: 
With perfect capital mobility, there should be no relation between domestic 
saving and domestic investment: saving in each country corresponds to the 
worldwide opportunities for investment while investment in that country is 
financed by the worldwide pool of capital. Conversely, if incremental saving 
tends to be invested in the country of origin, differences among countries in 
investment rates should correspond closely to differences in saving rates. 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980, pp. 317) 
Feldstein and Horioka report evidence strongly contradicting the hypothesis of perfect 
international capital mobility. In Table 2 we report regression results based on their data 
set and run a similar regression using the same group of countries on a more recent data 
set provided in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000). The results imply that international capital 
mobility is still far from perfect, although higher than in the 1960-74 period considered 
in Feldstein and Horioka (1980). 
Table 2. Relationship between savings and investment (dependent variable: I/Y) 
  Feldstein and Horioka 
(1980) 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) 
        Period 1960-‘74  Period 1990-‘97 
     
Constant  0.031  0.071 
  (0.031)  (0.019) 
S/Y  0.904  0.638 
  (0.067)  0.095) 
R2  0.9  0.73 
N  19  19 
 
Note: The regression method is OLS. Standard errors are between brackets 
4.2  The consumption correlations puzzle 
International capital markets perform several functions. First, capital markets lead to an 
efficient allocation of funds across space and time. Funds flow to those places where POPULATION AGEING AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
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investment yields the highest rate of return. In the previous subsection we have seen that 
the international capital market does not perform the first function optimally, since 
domestic investments still depends on domestic savings. Second, capital mobility allows 
investors to diversify portfolios and to share risks; countries can borrow or lend to 
absorb transitory changes in income so as to avoid abrupt changes in consumption. In 
this subsection we try to assess how capital markets perform this function. 
International diversification of a portfolio brings the advantage that the return on this 
portfolio becomes less volatile: the total risk becomes lower because unexpected gains 
and losses cancel out. With mobility of assets, one would expect that investors in 
different countries hold portfolios that are more or less similar in their composition, so 
that (undiversifiable) risks are shared. This would imply that changes in capital incomes 
are similar across countries and, thus, that the correlation of consumption is higher than 
the correlation of production. Table  3 shows the average coefficient of correlation 
between the  US and 20 other rich countries for the growth rates of gross domestic 
product (GDP) and consumption per capita for three 15-year periods. The table reveals 
that the coefficient for GDP in the last period is substantially higher than in the first 
period. This may reflect a better integration and more synchronization of economies.16 
The correlation coefficient for consumption per capita has hardly increased, however, 
during the second half of the twentieth century. Moreover, we see that the correlation of 
consumption per capita is smaller than that of GDP in both in the second and the third 
period. This suggests that international capital markets do not perform the function of 
risk sharing very well. 
Table 3. Average coefficient of the correlation between the US and 20 other OECD 
countries 
  Gross Domestic 
Production 
Consumption per capita 
1956-70  0.24  0.3 
  - 0.25  - 0.25 
1971-85  0.44  0.05 
  - 0.25  - 0.27 
1986-00  0.41  0.31 
  - 0.34  - 0.33 
Note: The results are based on two-year averages of annual growth rates. Between brackets is the standard 
deviation around the mean. 
Source: Own calculations based on Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). 
This latter finding is consistent with the observation that portfolios of investors still 
show a strong “home bias”, i.e. an over representation of national assets relative to 
                                                                 
16 Note that the correlation coefficient is the highest in the second 15-year period, when countries faced 
important common supply and demand shocks (the oil crises in 1973 and 1979 and the tight monetary 
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foreign assets. This home bias has decreased somewhat in recent years, at least in 
Western Europe as a result of the EMU. For example, pension funds as well as 
insurance companies hold a higher percentage of foreign equity in virtually all member 
states since the late 1990s. Yet, the home bias in asset portfolios is still important (see 
Adam et al., 2001). 
Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991) look at risk-sharing in the American, domestic 
financial markets. Under full risk-sharing, consumption should be perfectly correlated 
with aggregate shocks (for which insurance is not possible) but consumption should be 
independent of idiosyncratic disturbances. Both studies use micro-data for the US to test 
this implication of full risk-sharing. Cochrane (1991), f or example, related growth in 
food consumption to variables that capture idiosyncratic shocks, such as days of work 
lost because of illness, a dummy for involuntary job loss, days of work lost to strikes, 
etcetera. For many variables the idea of full risk-sharing is not rejected. But full 
insurance does not apply for all variables, e.g. the loss of more than 100 days of work 
because of to illness. Mace (1991) also finds evidence in favour of full insurance, but 
the results are not robust to changes in the specification of the utility function. The 
conclusion seems to be that domestic financial markets in the US perform the function 
of risk-sharing much better than international markets. Borders still matter, even for 
capital. 
4.3  Other indicators of capital market integration 
Adam et al. (2001) present an overview of indicators to measure the evolution of capital 
market integration in the European Union. These indicators give a more detailed picture 
of credit and bond markets. We discuss here three types of indicators: interest rates, 
bank charges for cross-border payments and market penetration of foreign banks.  
Data on four interest rates (the inter-bank 3-months rate, the 10-years government bond 
benchmark, the mortgage rate, and the corporate loan rate) are available.
17 According to 
Adam et al. (2001), both indicators reveal that European financial integration has 
increased, particularly after the introduction of the euro in 1999. The speed and degree 
of convergence, however, differs substantially across the various interest rates. The 
inter-bank rate and the long-term bond market are highly integrated, but the mortgage 
market and the corporate bond market are converging at a lower speed.  
Bank charges for cross-border payments are less clear on the process of integration. 
Although the within-country price dispersion for foreign bank transfers and the average 
duration for such transfers have fallen, the average cost of cross-country transfers has 
not converged and the transfer’s direction matters. This suggests room for 
improvements. 
A third indicator of financial integration on the credit and bond  market is market 
penetration of foreign banks. Foreign banks can enter the domestic market by (i) 
                                                                 
17 To study the pattern of integration, Adam et al. use the concepts of ß-convergence, borrowed from the 
empirical growth literature. In case of ß-convergence the various interest rates converge to the same 
steady state value over time. With ?-convergence they look at the cross-sectional dispersion of interest 
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acquiring or creating domestic branches within the country or (ii) direct cross-border 
lending or borrowing without physical presence in the domestic market. Retail banking 
by foreign banks on the domestic market would probably call for the first activity, while 
the second activity m ay be more relevant for the business sector. According to the 
presence of foreign banks, there is little evidence for credit market integration in the 
EU: cross-border penetration of banks is limited. Also, in terms of cross-border lending 
and borrowing activities there is substantial room for further integration, as these is a 
clear indication of home bias for these activities. 
4.4  Explanations for imperfect capital mobility 
A number of explanations for the apparently low international capital mobility have 
been suggested in the literature.
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Restrictions on international trade in capital 
Although capital markets are becoming better integrated they are still subject to 
restrictions. Impediments may derive from national regulations, and differences therein, 
that have a direct impact on trade in capital. They may also arise from barriers to entry 
for banks that result in imperfect international competition between them. 
Imperfect integration of goods markets  
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) show that the transportation costs in the international trade 
of goods go far towards explaining the Feldstein-Horioka saving-investment puzzle 
without, as is often the case, exacerbating other puzzles. Bovenberg (1989) and 
Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) explore a similar mechanism but assume imperfect 
substitutability between home and foreign consumption goods.  
The intuition of the argument goes as follows. Assume that goods of different origins 
are imperfect substitutes. This has the implication that to sell more units of a good, the 
price of that good has to fall. Consider furthermore a two-period economy. When net 
exports are negative in period 1, positive net exports in the second period are required 
(to pay back the loan in the first period). Now, the relative price of the good is lower in 
period 2 than in period 1. The expected deflation will push up the home real interest rate 
above the world interest rate. In that case, cross-border capital flows are smaller than 
casual inspection of international interest rate differentials would suggest. This helps to 
explain part of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle.  
Asymmetric information 
Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) see asymmetric information between domestic and 
foreign investors as an obstacle to international capital mobility. Investors usually know 
more about the prospects of their own economy and about investment opportunities at 
home, than about those in other countries. Indeed, although some information in capital 
markets can be transmitted digitally, a lot still requires face-to-face contact. To illustrate 
this, Table 4 shows some estimates presented in CEPR (2002) on the impact of distance 
on economic interactions in capital markets. The estimates express equity flows and 
foreign direct investment at different distances, relative to the flows at a distance of 
                                                                 
18 See for example Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for a more elaborate discussion. CANTON, EWIJK & TANG 
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1000 km. We see that distance substantially reduces equity transactions and, to a lesser 
extend, FDI. Hence, distance matters.  
Table 4. The impact of distance on cross-border capital flows 
  Equity flows  Foreign direct investment 
      1000 km  1  1 
2000 km  0.55  0.75 
4000 km  0.31  0.56 
8000 km  0.17  0.42 
 
Source: CEPR (2002). 
Portes and Rey (1999) provide an empirical assessment of the role of informational 
asymmetries. They use a panel data set on bilateral cross-border equity flows between 
14 countries over the 1989-96 period. Market size, openness, efficiency of transactions, 
and distance appear to be the most important determinants of transaction flows. 
Furthermore, it is shown that distance is largely a proxy for informational asymmetries. 
Portes and Rey include telephone call traffic and multinational bank branches to account 
for information transmission, and an index of the degree of insider training to account 
for information asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors. These variables 
show up with highly significant coefficients in the regression model, whereas 
significance of the distance variable is lost upon inclusion of these variables. 
The conclusion is thus that capital mobility within the group of developed countries is 
far from perfect. The explanations are found in restrictions on trade in capital, natural 
and other barriers to trade in goods markets and asymmetric information between 
domestic and foreign investors. Since these explanations are even more relevant for 
trade between developed and developing countries, the conclusion applies a fortiori to 
capital mobility between them. 
4.5  Will capital flow North to South? 
A rather popular idea is that the old North will finance its pensions by investing in the 
young South. Indeed, empirical work and model simulations corroborate this idea, at 
least up to 2010. It assumes that in the North the savings rate does not fall as fast as the 
investment rate. Without the possibility to invest in the South, this would tend to 
depress the rate of return on investment. With this possibility, however, excess capital 
will flow towards the South, looking for investment opportunities with a relatively high 
rate of return. 
The finding that capital mobility is rather limited, casts doubt on the idea that the North 
will invest in the South. Capital mobility within the group of developed countries is 
limited, let alone between developed and developing countries. Indeed, if this idea were 
to materialise, developing countries would need to liberalise their financial markets so 
as to remove these impediments. There are, however, other reasons that capital may not 
flow from developed to developing countries at a large scale. 
•  More than 10 years ago Lucas (1990) asked: Why doesn’t capital flow from rich 
to poor countries? He replied that the return in poor countries is not necessarily POPULATION AGEING AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
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higher than in rich countries, so that capital from the North will not seek 
investment opportunities in the South. This goes against the neoclassical 
assumption that backward, developing countries have ample investment 
opportunities with high rates of return. It is this assumption from which the idea 
of convergence derives: the poor countries will grow faster than and catch-up 
with the rich countries. High growth, however, is not a common experience for 
developing countries and convergence is at best conditional on many factors. 
Lucas points at human capital in explaining low marginal returns to physical 
capital in developing countries. Cross-country differences in the marginal 
product of capital are smaller when account is taken of international differences 
in human capital per worker. More recently, Hall and Jones (1999) allow for 
cross-country differences in total factor productivity, and show that persistent 
international differences in per capita output are the result of long-lasting 
differences in social infrastructure. 
•  In countries with good growth prospects, often in Asia, savings rates are high as 
well. For example, Figure 5 shows that the savings rate in China is roughly 
twice as high as in the US. In other words, the (fast-growing part of the) South 
does not need the capital from the North. Developing countries may welcome 
foreign direct investment from the rich countries because this enables them to 
learn new production techniques and methods. But not because they lack the 
funds to finance investment. 
•  Finally, ageing is not confined to developed countries, but is rather a world-wide 
phenomenon. Figure  1 shows, for example, that also in China the old-age 
dependency ratio will increase after 2010 and eventually be higher than in the 
US. Of course, ageing will occur later in developing countries than in developed 
countries. Capital flows can potentially exploit this difference in timing. 
5.  The impact of lower interest rates 
In the  absence of sufficient outlets for excess savings on international 
capital markets, policies to stimulate savings by current generations will 
lead to lower interest rates, thereby making a shift towards more funded 
pension systems less attractive. Simulations for the Netherlands show, 
however, that a lower interest rate also implies more investment and higher 
wages, mitigating these negative effects. 
For a single economy international capital markets may provide a sufficient outlet for 
excess savings in the wake of ageing. For the larger blocks within the OECD world 
exporting its excess capital is not a feasible option, however. First, ageing is a 
worldwide phenomenon; there is no major country that can easily absorb the surplus of 
savings of the ageing countries. Second, because of capital market imperfections it is 
difficult to exploit the differences that exist in speed and timing of ageing across 
countries. The evidence on capital mobility casts doubt on the idea that the rich and 
relatively fast ageing countries can finance old-age pensions by investing their savings 
in poor but fast-growing countries. When in the early stages of ageing a gap between 
savings and investment rates opens up in (some of) the rich countries and the excess CANTON, EWIJK & TANG 
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savings cannot be exported to the poor but fast-growing countries the interest rate will 
have to fall to let demand and supply meet.  
A falling return on savings seems a threat to policies that aim to raise national savings. 
Governments try to move towards a funded pension system and/or to reduce 
government debt (see section 3.3). Without these policies the tax burden on the young, 
working generations may rise significantly, exacerbating already existing tax distortions 
and reducing economic efficiency. When the return on savings falls, these policies 
become less effective: more savings are needed now to guarantee old-age pensions, or 
part thereof, in real terms later. In other words, the contributions to pension funds or 
taxes must rise more with a falling than constant rate of  return on savings. In fact, 
promoting national savings seems to have a negative international spill over: the larger 
the group of countries that want to export capital but cannot, the larger the downward 
effect on the interest rate will be. This suggests – the other way around – that the rich 
and ageing countries have much to win from capital mobility: investment opportunities 
in developing countries that promise a relatively high rate of return help them to deal 
with the problem of financing old-age pensions.  
The interest rate is, however, not only relevant for pensions savings. Changes therein 
will also affect other economic variables. A lower interest rate will also imply a higher 
capital-labour ratio and thus a higher wage rate, which reinforces the basis of a PAYG-
system. Besides, it will also imply that the debt burden will press less heavily on 
governments. Therefore we will explore the implications of different scenarios for the 
interest rate in more details. 
Simulations for the average international interest rate based on general-equilibrium 
models produce mixed results. Most models predict that population ageing will lead to 
lower future interest rates (cf. INGENUE, 2001; Brooks, 2000; Börsch-Supan et al., 
2001), but some models produce increasing w orld interest rates (see for instance 
Kotlikoff et al., 2001). An important factor is actually the policies implemented to face 
the ageing problem. Policies which tend to focus on additional – public or private – 
yield lower interest rates than policies that foster participation and investment in human 
capital. As most models predict falling rates of return to capital and to be on the 
conservative side, we shall consider the case in which the world is confronted with 
downward pressure on the world interest rate in the decades ahead of us. In general, 
falling interest rates are bad news for pension funds, as the financial returns fall. But 
there are other effects as well. A lower interest rate also stimulates investment in 
physical (and human) capital and thereby raises productivity of labour. This leads to 
higher wages and higher GDP in the longer term. The higher wages tend to strengthen 
the financial base of the pension system. But, if outlays on pensions are indexed to 
wages, also the expenditures of pension funds are affected. Obviously, rising interest 
rates produce opposite effects. 
To obtain a more comprehensive view, Table 5 shows the effects for the Netherlands – 
with large pension funds – when the interest rate decreases with 1 percentage point in 
2010. This decrease could arise, for example, from more savings in other OECD 
countries. These effects are simulated with GAMMA, CPB’s overlapping generations 
model for the Dutch economy (Draper and Westerhout, 2002). POPULATION AGEING AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
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A lower interest rate leads to an inflow of capital. Investment shows a peak in 2010 and 
after that year a permanent increase of more than 8%, reflecting replacement of worn-
out capital. The higher capital stock leads to higher labour productivity. As a result the 
wage rate increases with 5.6%.  Nevertheless, workers do not necessarily see an 
improvement in their disposable income. Contributions for their pensions have to rise to 
make up for the lower return on pension savings. Even more importantly, contributions 
for others’ pensions will rise. The reason is that in the Netherlands the level of old-age 
pensions is indexed to the wage rate. In fact, the net benefit that the working generations 
derive from the funded pension system (the net present value of contributions and old-
age pensions) will g o down for the working generations and go up for the already 
retired generations.  
The public sector does not benefit from a lower interest rate either. Pension 
contributions are tax-deductible, and the government will see its revenue fall when these 
contributions rise steeply. Besides, the effect of lower interest payments is negative on 
impact but not very strong. Other expenditures than interest payments tend to rise: the 
wages for civil servants will rise and the demand for health care increases. The result is 
that the financial position of the public sector worsens: debt will start to rise and interest 
payments on this debt eventually rise as well. 
Table 5. A 1% decrease in the interest rate in 2010: Effects for the Netherlands 
  2010  2015  2025  2050 
         
Relative change         
Investment  108.2  8.1  8.1  8.1 
Wage rate  5.6  5.6  5.6  5.6 
         
Absolute change, % of GDP         
Pension contributions  13.7  29.3  10.2  7.7 
    To own pension  1.4  2  2.4  2.7 
    To others’ pensions  12.3  27.3  7.8  5 
         
Absolute change, % of GDP         
Public revenues  1.1  - 2.5  - 2  - 2.9 
Public expenditure  - 0.1  0  0.8  2.8 
    Interest payments  - 0.1  - 0.1  0.4  2.2 
    Expenditure excluding interest  0  0.1  0.3  0.6 
 
Sources: CPB, own calculations with GAMMA. 
Working generations are not necessarily hurt by a lower interest rate. Of course, a lower 
rate of return on savings requires higher savings now to ensure an adequate level of the 
old-age pension later. But it also leads to more investments and higher wages, so that 
the working generations can afford higher savings. In the case of the Netherlands the 
working generations are nevertheless worse-off. The interest rate risk is not equally 
shared across generations. The already retired generations see their income rise, since CANTON, EWIJK & TANG 
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old-age pensions are indexed to wages. As a result, intergenerational redistribution 
increases, at the expense of the working generations. 
Moving towards a funded pension system makes countries more vulnerable for interest 
rate risks. Capital mobility may help to reduce these risks, since trade in capital exploits 
and eradicates interest rate differentials and changes therein. The results for the 
Netherlands suggest, however, that the interest rate risks are not necessarily large, 
because high wages may accompany low interest rates. The distribution of interest rate 
risks is perhaps a larger problem, depending on the institutional setting. Wage-indexed 
pensions increase the exposure to interest rate risks for the working generations. 
6.  Conclusion 
Although the problem of population  ageing is a world-wide phenomenon, there are 
significant differences in  the  magnitude and timing of ageing across countries. The 
differences are most pronounced between the developed countries on the one hand and 
the developing and emerging regions (Africa, Asia and Latin America) on the other 
hand. In principle, these differences could help to relieve the consequences of ageing 
around the world. Ideally fast-ageing countries should temporarily invest their excess 
savings in countries that are less subject to ageing. Model simulations suggest that the 
fast-ageing countries (Europe, Japan, and the US) will improve their net foreign asset 
position in the next 10 to 20 years, when it reaches a turning point. Existing evidence on 
international capital mobility casts doubt on the opportunities for investing  in 
international capital markets. First, capital mobility is rather limited, especially within 
developing countries. This considerably reduces the scope for investing the surplus of 
the ageing countries in ‘younger’ areas. Second, the rapidly growing new and old Asian 
tigers appear to finance their growth by high rates of savings themselves.  
As a consequence, savings and investment will be linked for the major economic blocks 
(US and Europe) in the OECD area. Discrepancies between savings and investment will 
not be absorbed by external financial markets, but will be solved by the adjustment of 
the interest rate. This should be taken into account when deciding on the policies 
towards ageing. Exporting the financial consequences of ageing is no policy option for 
major economic blocks like Europe or the US.  
Population ageing will put the solidarity between generations under pressure. In the next 
40 years the number of pensioners is expected to double relative to the number of 
workers. This will put a heavy burden on future generations in those countries whose 
institutions  rely  on PAYG for financing pensions and health care to a great extent. 
Timely policy action is called for. Broadly speaking, there are two directions for policy 
reforms:  
•  Investing in human capital  
Ageing is partly the result of increasing longevity. A straightforward answer to 
the ageing problem is therefore to raise the  (effective) retirement age.  There 
seems to be scope for such a policy particularly in Europe as the participation of 
workers between the ages of 55 and 65 is exceptionally low. Stimulating  the 
participation of younger generations can also help as it broadens the basis for 
intergenerational solidarity.  
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•  Investing in financial and physical capital 
The process is partly temporary. The baby boom and the sharp drop in fertility in 
the 1960s and 1970s have caused a lengthy transition to a new, steady state with 
a greyer population on average. The economic consequences of demographic 
transition can be smoothed if current generations can, to a larger extent ‘pay for 
their own pensions’ by increasing savings now. This can be done by stimulating 
pension savings (a partial shift to funded pensions) or by increasing government 
savings by creating a surplus in the government budget and reducing public 
debt. 
In a world with imperfect international capital mobility both policy options are inter-
related. The tendency of the interest rate to fall when public and private savings are 
stimulated according to the second policy option makes the first policy option of 
investing in human capital all the more important. Savings and investment go hand in 
hand, also in government policy. A sustainable policy towards ageing stands on two 
legs: stability  and growth. Budgetary discipline is indispensable, but it should not 
overshadow the need  for sound policies towards human capital and labour market 
participation.  
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APPENDIX:  
ESTIMATED RELATION BETWEEN SAVINGS AND AGE COMPOSITION 
Background 
For the estimation of the relationship between savings and the demographic 
composition of economies, we have used a slightly modified version of the commonly-
used methodology developed in Fair and Dominguez (1991) to estimate age-dependent 
economic decisions such as savings, participation, etc. We estimate the following 
equation: 
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where  it S  is the average savings rate of country i over the time period t-t+5,  i , 0 b  is a 
series of country-specific fixed effects,  it g  is the growth rate of GDP per capita of 
country i over the time period t-t+5, and  it j C ,  is the fraction of cohort j of the total 
population in country i at time t. In total, we have seventeen 5-year cohorts, namely 0-5, 
5-10, 10-15, ..., 75-80 and 80 and above. Multi-collinearity among the cohort-size 
variables complicates the estimation of this equation. We therefore follow Fair and 
Dominguez in putting more structure on the estimated effects sizes  j a . The polynomial 
constraint that we impose is 
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Furthermore, we impose the restriction that 
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This implies that the average a over an individual’s life time is equal to zero and that the 
a’s for specific periods in life can be seen as deviations from the life-time average. We 
can then derive that 
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The age variables thus enter into the regression equation in the following way: 
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Our estimation yields estimates for the country specific fixed effects,  1 b ,  1 g ,  2 g , and 
3 g . Using equation (4), we obtain the value of  0 g . Finally, using  0 g ,  1 g ,  2 g ,  3 g  and 
equation (A3), the cohort-specific effects on savings are derived. The contribution of 
ageing to (variation in) savings can then simply be determined by using 
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Data 
Our data are derived from a variety of sources. Information on the age composition of 
economies is taken from the United Nations. Data on GDP per worker are taken from 
the Penn World Table (Mark 6.1). The growth rate was constructed as an average 
annual growth rate. GDP per worker is expressed in constant dollars, where conversion 
is based on purchasing power parities. Our measure for savings is average Gross 
Domestic Savings for the five-year periods distinguished in the analysis and is taken 
from the World Bank (World Development Indicators, 2002). Their data have been 
aggregated to five-year cohorts, neglecting the distinction between males and females. 
Regression results 
The regression results underlying the figures in the main text are reported in Table A1. 
Equations 1 and 2 use fairly aggregated cohorts reducing the problem of multi-
collinearity among the cohort measures. These results give a first impression of the POPULATION AGEING AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
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variation of savings over the lifetime of individuals. They have been used to generate 
the predictions for savings in Figure 5 in the main text.
19 
Equations 3 and 4 use five-year cohorts, aggravating the problem of multi-collinearity 
and requiring estimation according to the Fair and Dominguez method laid out in the 
first part of this appendix. The evolution of savings over an individual’s lifetime based 
on these regressions is given in Figure 3 in the main text. 
Results are reported for both our preferred extensive sample (covering 107 countries) as 
well as for a restricted sample of only OECD countries to give a first feeling of the 
sensitivity of our results for sampling. More detailed sensitivity analyses considering 
both sampling as well as specification are available upon request. 
Table A1. Dependent variable is average domestic savings (% of GDP), pooled cross-section 
analysis with five-year periods, 1960-2000 
  Simple approach  Simple approach  F&D approach  F&D approach 
  (107 countries)  (OECD only)  (107 countries)  (OECD only) 
g   0.14  0.64***  0.20*  0.65*** 
  (1.34)  (4.31)  (1.89)  (3.97) 
45 25- C  
0.57***  - 0.09     
  (4.52)  (- 0.67)     
65 45- C  
0.84***  0.06     
  (3.82)  (0.31)     
65 > C   - 0.79***  - 0.55***     
  (- 3.38)  (- 3.28)     
1 Z  
    0.39***  - 0.270*** 
      (2.69)  (- 2.19) 
2 Z  
    - 0.0249  - 0.0434*** 
      (- 1.16)  (2.90) 
3 Z  
    -5.8×10-5  - 0.0019*** 
      (- 0.07)  (- 3.26) 
2
adj R
 
0.77  0.64  0.78  0.65 
N  608  153  608  153 
Note: All equations are estimated using country-specific fixed effects. White heteroskedasticity 
consistent t-statistics have been reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** means significance at, 
respectively 10, 5 and 1%. 
                                                                 
19 The reason for using this specification for predicting savings for the period up to 2050 instead of the 
Fair and Dominguez specification is related to the fact that the out-of-sample behaviour of the Fair and 
Dominguez specification is less realistic than for the simple specification using cohorts. This is likely to 
be related to the imposed functional form in the Fair and Dominguez specification. More specifically, 
savings rates are projected to become negative for rapidly ageing countries in the course of the 21
st 
century when using the Fair and Dominguez specifications. CANTON, EWIJK & TANG 
38 
From the third regression specification,  0 g  is straightforwardly derived as -0.81. This 
results in a pattern of a’s as depicted in Figure 4 in the main text. This pattern is 
generally found for a wide range of different specifications. We have, for example, 
included the real interest rate as an explanatory variable, measures of the degree of 
development of financial markets, etc., but the general picture that emerges tends to 
prevail. It has to be noted that this pattern is f airly consistent with other econometric 
analyses where the relationship between ageing and savings have been estimated. Figure 
5 is based on the first specification in Table A1. Again, this pattern is found for a wide 
range of alternative specifications. It is to be noted, though, that using the Fair and 
Dominguez specifications yields extreme savings rates for several countries after 2030. 
This is likely to be caused by the imposed functional form, resulting in relatively poor 
out-of-sample behaviour (see also footnote number 19). TITLES PUBLISHED BY ENEPRI  
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